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The 2007–2008 upsurge in agricultural commodity 
prices gave rise to widespread concern about investors 
causing a “global land rush”. Large land deals can 
provide opportunities for better access to capital, 
transfer of technology, and advances in productivity 
and employment generation. But they carry risks 
of dispossession and loss of livelihoods, corruption, 
deterioration in local food security, environmental 
damage, and long-term social polarization that led some 
countries to recently pass legislation restricting foreign 
land acquisition. To stimulate evidence-based debate, this 
paper explores determinants of foreign land acquisition 
for large-scale agriculture. It quantifies demand for land 
deals, showing it focused on Africa where land expansion 
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is about 20 times the level it was in the past. The analysis 
uses data on bilateral investment relationships, together 
with newly constructed indicators of agro-ecological 
suitability in non-protected and forested areas with 
low population density as well as land rights security. 
It estimates gravity models that can help identify 
determinants of foreign land acquisition dedicated to 
large-scale agriculture. The results confirm the central role 
of agro-ecological potential as a pull factor. In contrast 
to the literature on foreign investment in general, the 
quality of the business climate is insignificant, whereas 
weak land governance and tenure security for current 
users make countries more attractive for investors. 
Implications for policy are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
After  decades  of stagnant  or  declining  commodity  prices  when  agriculture  was  considered  a ‗sunset 
industry‘, recent increases in the level and volatility of commodity prices and the resulting demand for 
land have taken many observers by surprise. This phenomenon has been accompanied by a rising interest 
in  acquiring  agricultural  land  by  investors,  including  sovereign  wealth  and  private  equity  funds, 
agricultural producers, and key players from the food and agri-business industry. Investors‘ motivations 
include economic considerations, mistrust in markets and concern about political stability, or speculation 
on future demand for food and fiber, or future payment for environmental services including for carbon 
sequestration. Some stakeholders, including many host-country governments, welcome such investment 
as  an  opportunity  to  overcome  decades  of  under-investment  in  the  sector,  create  employment,  and 
leapfrog and take advantage of recent technological development. Others denounce it as a ―land grab‖ 
(Zoomers 2010). They point to the irony of envisaging large exports of food from countries which in 
some cases depend on regular food aid. It is noted that specific projects‘ speculative nature, questionable 
economic basis, or lack of consultation and compensation of local people calls for a global response (De 
Schutter 2011). In a context of diametrically opposite perceptions, the objective of the present paper is to 
provide greater clarity on the numbers involved and the factors driving such investment. This is done by 
quantifying demand for land deals, and exploring the determinants of foreign land acquisition for large-
scale agriculture using data on bilateral investment relationships. This work is an important first step to 
assess potential long-term impacts and discuss policy implications.  
The analysis of large-scale land deals is relevant for a number of key development issues. One such issue 
is the debate on the most appropriate structure of agricultural production. The exceptionally large poverty 
elasticity of growth in smallholder agriculture (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2010, Loayza and Raddatz 2010) 
that is reflected in rapid recent poverty reduction in Asian economies such as China, and the fact that the 
majority of poor are still located in rural areas led observers to highlight the importance of a smallholder 
structure for poverty reduction (Lipton 2009, World Bank 2007). At the same time, disillusion with the 
limited success of smallholder-based efforts to improve productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa (Collier 2008) 
and apparent export competitiveness of ―mega-farms‖ in Latin America or Eastern Europe during the 
2007/8 global food crisis have led to renewed questions about whether, despite a mixed record, large scale 
agriculture can be a path out of poverty and to development.  
Whatever the envisaged scenario, renewed pressure on land raises the issue of whether there is sufficient 
competition and transparency to ensure that land owners or users are able to either transfer their land at a 
fair price or hold on to it as opposed to having it taken away without their consent and in what may be 
perceived  an  unfair  deal.  This  resonates  with  recent  contributions  to  the  literature  that  suggest  that  
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resource abundance can contribute to more broad-based development only if well-governed institutions to 
manage  these  resources  exist  (Oechslin  2010).  This  is  borne  out  by  empirical  evidence  both  across 
countries (Cabrales and Hauk 2011) and within more specific country contexts where resource booms 
may  have  fuelled  widespread  rent-seeking  and  corruption  (Bhattacharyya  and  Hodler  2010)  or  even 
violence (Angrist and Kugler 2008) rather than economic development.  
To  better  understand  this  phenomenon  and  its  potential  impact,  an  empirical  analysis  of  the  factors 
driving  transnational land acquisition  is  needed.  To  this  end,  we  constructed a  global  database  with 
country-level information on both foreign demand for land and implemented projects as documented in 
international and local press reports. We complement it with country-specific assessments of the amount 
of potentially suitable land and other relevant variables. We then use bilateral investment relationships 
from  the  database  to  estimate  gravity  models  that  can  help  identify  determinants  of  foreign  land 
acquisition. Results confirm the central role of agro-ecological potential as a pull factor but suggest that, 
in contrast to what is found for foreign investment more generally, rule of law and good governance have 
no  effect  on  the  number  of  land-related  investment.  Moreover,  and  counter-intuitively,  we  find  that 
countries where governance of the land sector and tenure security are weak have been most attractive for 
investors. This finding, which resonates with concerns articulated by parts of civil society, suggests that, 
to minimize the risk that such investments fail to produce benefits for local populations , the micro-level 
and project-based approach that has dominated the global debate so far will need to be complemented 
with an emphasis and determined action to improve land governance, transparency and global monitoring.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 puts recent land demand into broader context, highlighting 
the importance of governance in attracting investments. It draws on an analysis of how foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is treated in the macro-literature to suggest a methodological approach, and outlines 
how we address specific data needs. Section 3 presents our cross-sectional data on land demand, outlines 
the econometric approach, and briefly discusses relevant descriptive statistics. Key econometric results in 
section 4 support the importance of food import demand as motivations for countries to seek out land 
abroad (‗push factors‘) and of agro-ecological suitability as key determinants for the choice of destination 
(‗pull factors‘). They also highlight the extent to which weak land governance seems to encourage rather 
than  discourage  transnational  demand  for  land.  Section  5  concludes  by  highlighting  a  number  of 
implications for policy. 
2. Conceptual framework and empirical evidence 
In a historical perspective, the surge of demand for land in the wake of the 2007/2008 commodity price 
was but one of a series of booms in farm land. Putting it into context also helps to understand the role of 
technical,  economic,  and  institutional  factors  in  shaping  the  nature  and  eventual  impact  of  such  
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investment. We also summarize methodological lessons from the macro-literature on bilateral investment 
to empirically investigate this phenomenon and discuss some of the specific variables that need to be 
considered in the empirical analysis, including  cultural and physical proximity, and endowment with 
fertile land, and (land) governance.  
2.1 A broader perspective  
Large trans-national land acquisitions, though rarely via market processes,  were first observed in the 
context of conquests and colonial expansion. However, as the purposes frequently included promoting the 
colonists‘ own operations using cheap labor, the share of land actually utilized often remained small 
(Conning and Robinson 2007). In fact, many of the ventures established in this context survived only 
because they benefited from subsidies and market distortions in their favor (Binswanger et al. 1995). 
Subsequent spikes in acquisition of large tracts of land resulted from changes in the cost of transport such 
as those associated with steamships and refrigeration, or with technology shifts that made use of lands 
which  had  previously  been  thought  to  be  beyond  the  frontier  viable  economically.  While  specific 
circumstances varied immensely, some general lessons emerge.  
First,  numerous  studies  document  the  long-term  effects  of  the  way  in  which  land  was  accessed  in 
developing countries (Banerjee and Iyer 2005, Iyer 2010) as well as in developed countries (Libecap and 
Lueck 2011). This implies that the institutions established to make land available had impacts in the long 
term and shaped outcomes, in particular the economic and social development of original land users, for 
decades and sometimes centuries to come. The differential impact of Central America‘s  19
th century 
commodity booms provides an interesting illustration. Partly because the economic viability of large 
farms depended on a cheap labor force with limited outside options, large scale investments in countries 
pursuing a strategy of smallholder land ownership–such as Costa Rica and Colombia–was  much more 
favorable than in ones–such as El Salvador or Guatemala–whose strategy focused on establishing large 
plantations. Literacy rates have differed sharply between the two groups ever since the late 19th century 
and  significant  gaps  have  emerged  with  respect  to  other  human  development  indicators  and  the 
establishment of democracy. Where a large farm strategy had given rise to ‗landlord dominance‘, it took 
more than a generation longer, i.e. some 40 years, for democracy to take hold than in countries where the 
structure of production focuses on smallholders (Nugent and Robinson 2010). More recently, policies that 
required  to  demonstrate  ―productive‖  use  of  land  in  Brazil,  together  with  capital  subsidies,  have 
encouraged both deforestation (Pacheco and Poccard Chapuis 2009) and very capital-intensive modes of 
production that have a limited impact on employment generation and poverty reduction.  
Second, agriculture is a business that faces technical challenges, long gestation periods, low margins, and 
a dependence on the vagaries of weather and variation in micro-climatic conditions. In many developing  
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countries, these are exacerbated by past neglect of public spending on technology and infrastructure and 
institutional challenges. Overcoming these and making a profit can be difficult even for ventures that are 
technically and economically viable in principle. In fact, many well-intended or well-resourced schemes, 
including the ―bonanza farms‖ established in the Dakotas in 1860-1900 (Drache 1964), Brazilian rubber 
plantations established by Henry Ford in the 1920s (Grandin 2009), and efforts in the 1960s to establish 
large-scale agriculture in the Lakeland Downs of Australia‘s far Northeast ended in spectacular failure 
and reverted back to smallholder cultivation. As a result, land that had been acquired at high cost during 
the  boom  was  later  often  transferred  at  a  fraction  of  the  initial  acquisition  price.  The  challenges  of 
―greenfield‖ investments in developing countries are also evident from the fact that even not-for profit 
institutions  with  access  to  large  amounts  of  capital  and  expertise  such  as  the  Commonwealth 
Development Corporation only managed success rates of some 20%.
5 This would not be a problem in a 
well-governed institutional environment  where  failure  is signaled  quickly and avenues for smooth 
liquidation  are  available.  I t  can,  however,  create  problems,  including  attempts  by  unsuccessful 
entrepreneurs to make local communities bear the cost of failure if these conditions do not apply.  
Third, a number of examples highlight that targeted support to public goods in priority sectors can have 
positive impacts if deployed in  a transparent way and in  the context of a strategy to exploit a hitherto 
underutilized resource in line with  the country‘s comparative advantage. In Uruguay for instance, the 
provisions for subsidies and tax breaks in  the 1987 forestry law helped attract FDI to establish a globally 
competitive forestry industry that generated employment and income, provided environmental benefits, 
and increased land values (Morales Olmos 2007).
6 In Brazil, long term  investments in technology  to 
generate varieties and tillage methods  suited to the  cerrado’s low latitudes and acid soils provided the 
basis for expansion into vast areas of the country‘s hinterland that had not been cultivated in the 1970s, 
and generated large economic benefits. Still, this process was far from straightforward and many lessons 
regarding  the  need  for  public  investment,  institutional  pre-conditions,  and  environmental  protection 
emerged (World Bank 2009). In Peru‘s Pacific region, transparent auctions of some 235,500 ha of public 
land that aimed to bring in large agricultural investment with strong technical vetting brought in almost 
US$50 million in investment over the past 15 years, helping the country to emerge as a major high-value 
agro-exporter of horticultural produce, and generating many jobs (Hernandez 2010). In contrast, offering 
land below its true opportunity cost is unlikely to attract the right types of investors, and–to the extent that 
this involves taking it from local communities without proper process or adequate compensation—may 
create large social problems. In Indonesia, efforts to foster development of the palm oil industry by giving 
                                                 
5 This figure is from G. Dixie, in a World Bank personal communication. Even in plantation crops such as bananas or oil palm, where large-scale 
cultivation  offers  advantages,  the  record  of  transnational  investments  is  mixed  and  large  companies  are  often  accused  of  non-competitive 
behavior and getting embroiled in local politics, as in Guatemala in the 1950s (Brockett 1988).  
6 Subsidies and tax breaks targeted forest plantations or processing industries on marginal lands that had previously been used for cattle ranching.   
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away forested land for free have failed to lead to sustainable investment in numerous cases. Instead, it 
contributed to the loss of land with high biodiversity, to rent seeking, and to conflict (Koh and Wilcove 
2008).
7 In Sudan, the transfer of land for free neglected traditional users‘ rights and led to conflict and soil 
mining rather than to the establishment of a competitive farm sector (Johnson 2003).  
Fourth, agricultural cultivation has traditionally been dominated by small farms and increases in the 
average farm size driven largely by higher non-agricultural wages. New technological developments in 
crop  breeding,  tillage,  and  information technology  all  make  labor  supervision  easier. They  may  also 
reduce the diseconomies of scale that have traditionally been associated with large agricultural operations 
and transmit benefits from vertical coordination throughout the value chain to the stage of production 
(Deininger and Byerlee 2011). This is in some sense similar to plantation crops where such integration 
has long provided a strong competitive advantage to larger operations. In some cases, this can lead to 
situations where efficient, diversified, and vertically integrated operators can lease farmers‘ land at prices 
higher than what these could obtain from self-cultivation (Regunaga 2010). At the same time, many 
technical innovations are less scale-biased than often thought–as information technology, for example, 
can  also be  used to  better  coordinate smallholder  farmers.  Moreover,  very  large  units of  production 
emerge in many cases  because of their superior ability to deal with market imperfections (access to 
finance), lack of public goods (education), and weak governance. If other markets work, removal of these 
constraints would then give rise to smaller operational farm sizes. While more detailed research is needed, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that in many settings farms are very large not because of inherent advantages 
of the technology but because large operators‘ superior ability of to deal with other market imperfections.  
2.2 Insights from the macro literature  
The recent nature of the phenomenon implies that empirical analysis has thus far been limited. In fact, 
most of the literature on land markets in developing countries focuses on transfers among locals, usually 
small  farmers  (Deininger 2003,  Deininger  and  Feder  2001) that  may  be  of  limited  relevance  in this 
context. While we know of no cross-country study addressing foreign land acquisition, the literature on 
foreign investment flows offers relevant methodological and substantive lessons.  
Methodologically, the empirical literature on the determinants of capital flows has distinguished between 
pull and push factors to explain the magnitude and distribution of capital flows to developing countries 
(Calvo et al. 1996).
8 By taking into account country-specific factors such as cultural and geographical 
proximity, the analysis of bilateral flows between specific investor and host countries can add significant 
insights to our understanding of transnational investments  (Benassy-Quere et al. 2007). Gravity models 
                                                 
7 By some estimates up to 12 million ha have been allocated to oil palm and deforested but not planted (Fargione et al. 2008). 
8 Push factors (e.g. business cycle in G7 countries) explain the magnitude of capital flows. Pull factors relate to domestic country characteristics 
(e.g. economic performance) that help explain the distribution of capital flows across developing countries.  
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that empirically relate FDI between two countries to the size of each partner, bilateral distance and a set 
of variables accounting for relative costs are consistent with a strand of theoretical literature on trade and 
capital  flows  (Markusen  and  Venables  1998).  They  allow  us  to  establish  a  synthesis  of  modeling 
structures relying on both horizontal and vertical motives for FDI (Markusen and Venables 2000) and 
have thus been widely used in the literature to explain bilateral FDI (Wei 2000).
9  
Substantively, a key stylized fact is that, while liberalization of capital markets over the past decades has 
considerably increased capital flows to developing countries (Prasad et al. 2008) , the volume of such 
flows remained well below the level that would be predicted by neoclassical theory  in order to equalize 
returns to  capital. This  finding is commonly referred to as the Lucas paradox  (Lucas 1990). In fact, 
countries with weak rule of law, high political or default risk, underdeveloped financial markets, or high 
transaction cost and deficiencies in governance may attract only limited investment flows even if they 
offer high rates of return  (Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002). In this respect, institutional factors have been 
shown to play an important role in unilateral models to explain the magnitude and nature of capital flows 
towards developing and emerging economies in a cross section of countries (Alfaro et al. 2008). 
At the same time, the magnitude and nature of capital flows varies across countries (Schnitzer 2002). 
Different forms of investment differ from each other with the main trade-off being between the length of 
commitment implied in such investment (or conversely the ease of withdrawing funds) and the ability to 
exercise managerial control (Sawant 2010). The share of FDI in total capital flows is likely to be higher in 
countries with weak governance because, in such cases, investors will demand ways of investing that will 
provide  them  with  greater  control  (Hausmann  et  al.  2007).
10  Given  its long time horizon and the 
associated potential to transfer technology, knowledge, and skills, direct foreign investment (FDI) rather 
than portfolio investment is often seen as more conducive to local development. Indeed, cross -country 
analysis points to a positive effect of FDI on GDP growth (Borensztein et al. 1998). 
2.3 Implications for analyzing farmland investment  
Applying the above framework to cross-border farmland investment, while straightforward in principle, 
requires complementing traditional models with specific variables in three areas. First, as much of the 
initial demand for land seems to have been driven by fear of high dependence on food imports and threats 
of  political  instability,  bilateral  variables  such  as  physical,  cultural,  and  geopolitical  proximity  (e.g. 
                                                 
9 Horizontal motives for the location of multinational firms abroad relates to their desire to be closer to markets. Vertical motives explain the 
same decision from a desire to take advantage of different production costs for different stages of production (Helpman 1984). 
10 The OECD defines FDI as "an activity in which an investor resident in one country obtains a lasting interest in, and a signif icant influence on 
the management of, an entity resident in another country. This may involve either creating an entirely new enterprise (―greenfield‖ investment) 
or, more typically, changing the ownership of existing enterprises via mergers and acquisitions." A takeover by a foreign firm is considered FDI 
if the foreign firm holds at least 10% of the voting rights on the board.  
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language or past colonial relationship) will need to be complemented with information on countries‘ 
dependence on food imports. This is dealt with in a straightforward way by using standard FAO figures.  
Second, as the attractiveness of a country for farmland investment will depend on the availability of non-
cultivated land with high agro-ecological potential that is easily accessible, a measure for potential agro-
ecological suitability of land, overlaid with current land use, is needed. Past attempts to measure the 
amount of land potentially available for agriculture suffered from conceptual and technical limitations 
(Young 2000, Ramankutty et al. 2008). If potentially suitable land is either covered by forest or home to 
traditional communities, much of what could potentially be available for agriculture may at the same time 
provide environmental and social benefits. A proper definition of potentially ―available‖ land will thus 
have to exclude protected areas, forests, and areas that are already occupied. To make this operational we 
use  the  agro-ecological  potential  for  rainfed  cultivation
11  as defined  by  the Global Agro-ecological 
Zoning project (Fischer et al. 2002) .
 To make this information useful for our purpose, we overlay this 
with information on actual land use and population density drawing on a variety of databases
12 to derive a 
measure of land with high potential for rainfed cultivation that is currently not utilized and that excludes 
forests, protected areas, and areas with a population threshold above a certain maximum. Details of the 
methodology are discussed in Fischer and Shah (2010). Aggregate results, by region and for the world in 
total, are illustrated in Table 1. If defined this way, the area of total ―available‖ land amounts to some 445 
million ha, compared to about 1.5 billion ha already under cultivation (Deininger et al. 2011a). Most of 
this land is in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe (201, 123, and 52 million ha, 
respectively) although in the latter, relatively higher shares of land are in proximity to markets. As land 
availability is a key driver of the ―land rush‖, we expect this variable to be positive and highly significant. 
Third, while the link between foreign investment and  governance  has long been highlighted, special 
attention to land governance may be warranted.
13 To address this issue, we draw on three complementary 
indicators for general and land governance. First, we use the Doing Business database which ranks the 
extent to which countries‘ legal and regulatory environment and uses the results to construct an index of 
―weak investor protection‖.
14 A low value of this index reflects weak protection of investors‘ rights. A 
                                                 
11 We focus on rainfed cultivation as issues related to riparian rights and seasonal availability of water in a certain area as well as the investment 
needs for irrigation would require a more in-depth treatment.  
12 Our measure of agricultural land outside the forest and protected areas is constructed from various bases, including Global L and Cover 2000 
(http://www-gem.jrc.it/glc2000) PAGE Global Agricultural Exten t (http://www. ifpri.org / dataset / pilot -analysis-global-Ecosystems-page), 
Global  Forest  Resources  Assessment  2000  (http://www.fao.org/forestry/32203/en)  and  World  Database  on  Protected  Areas  2009 
(http://www.wdpa.org / download.aspx). The extent of arable land outside forest and protected areas and in sparsely populated areas (that is to 
say less than 25 inhabitants per km2 or more than 4 ha per capita) uses LandScan 2003 Global Population (http://www .ornl.gov /Landscan/). 
13 Key relevant aspects of land governance are the clarity with which rights are assigned and the accessibility of textual and spatial information on 
rights, the way in which state land is managed, disposed of, and acquired, the way land is taxed and land use is regulated, a nd the existence, 
accessibility, and impartial nature of institutions for conflict resolution (Deininger et al. 2011b).  
14 The index consists of a weighte d average of indices measuring the transparency of transactions, the liability of company directors and 
shareholders, and the power of administrators to hold directors accountable for misconduct. The underlying premise that excessive regulation and 
red tape deters investment and foster corruption is not uncontroversial and has been challenged because it only measures inputs but not the quality 
of public goods, e.g. property rights, provided  (Arrunada 2007) and because it presumes an Anglo-Saxon model that may be less applicable in  
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second measure ranks countries‘ regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption, political stability, 
absence of violence, and voice and accountability in descending order in terms of percentiles of the 
distribution based on the World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2004). Low values characterize 
countries with poor governance. Finally, for land governance, we use a newly developed cross-country 
database assembled by the French Development Agency.  
Key variables of the land governance indicator include tenure security and recognition of existing land 
rights (even if not formalized), the existence of a land policy, and levels of land-related conflict. We use 
the first component from a principal component analysis of these variables as an indicator of overall 
tenure security. Low values describe countries with high levels of tenure insecurity. Whether good (land) 
governance increases a country‘s attractiveness for land-related investment is difficult to anticipate the 
direction of the effect as there are two countervailing forces. On the one hand, given the long time horizon 
of any agricultural investment, security of property rights is likely to be a key determinant of long-term 
investment decisions as investors will not tie up large amounts of resources in a country where weak or 
unclear rights create a danger of opportunistic government behavior and creeping expropriation (Schnitzer 
1999) once investments are sunk. The opposite could, however, also be true, i.e. large investors may find 
it easier to establish and defend property rights if (land) governance and the state‘s enforcement capacity 
and presence are weak. Some investors unfamiliar with customary tenure systems may indeed believe that 
it will be easier and more ‗secure‘ to acquire land directly from governments rather than by engaging in a 
dialogue with local rural populations. Others are quite outspoken about the perceived need and desire to 
enforce property rights through private militias--despite the problematic historical precedents.
 15  
3. Data, econometric approach, and descriptive statistics 
Country as well as cross-country level data on large scale land acquisition suggests that the phenomenon 
has reached large proportions. Press reports provide a consistent source of information that can be drawn 
upon to analyze the drivers of the phenomenon. We argue that a Poisson model is the most appropriate 
structure to econometrically explore the determinants of investment demand as well as of projects with 
actual production, and discuss descriptive statistics for key independent variables.  
3.1 Recent trends in large-scale land deals  
Official data on land deals from registries would, in principle, provide the best source of information on 
the phenomenon (at least for signed deals). However, efforts to obtain such data even for a subset of 
countries  illustrate  that,  partly  because  of  institutional  weaknesses,  such  information  is  remarkably 
difficult to obtain (Deininger et al. 2011a). In 6 countries where reasonably reliable information could be 
                                                                                                                                                             
other institutional contexts (Fauvarque-Cosson and Kerhuel 2009). 
15 For an interesting perspective on this, see the story of Jarch capital in Southern Sudan as reported in various media (e.g. Funk, 2010).   
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obtained, often by aggregating up from regional registries, we find support for the notion of a recent and 
marked increase in land transfers (Table 2). Total confirmed land transfers over the 2004-2009 period 
amounted to 4.0 million ha in Sudan, 2.7 million ha in Mozambique, 1.2 million ha in Ethiopia and 1.6 
million ha—although mainly through renegotiation of existing agreements—in Liberia. Comparing these 
figures to the estimated total available area in each country reveals that this respectively amounts to 8.6%, 
16.6%, and 25.4% of the total suitable non-forested non-protected area with a population density of less 
than 25 inhabitants per km
2 for Sudan, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, respectively. 
Given the difficulties of obtaining consistent data from official sources, we use information from press 
articles to get a global picture of the recent demand for large scale land acquisition. Our sample is based 
on such reports published between Oct. 1, 2008, and Aug. 31, 2009, as reported by the NGO GRAIN.
16 
Figure 1 plots the evolution of  the IMF food price index and the number of recorded press reports on 
cross-border land acquisitions. The ―land rush‖, or at least media awareness of it, started with the 2007 
2008 commodity price boom. While commodity prices soon returned to more moderate levels, investors‘ 
interest in land persisted. Using data on the size of projects where available in such reports, Table 3 
compares regional rates of land expansion in the 1961-2007 period to demand for land by investors. Press 
reports suggest that such demand disproportionately focused on Africa where almost 70% of the area of 
interest to investors was located but also that it was quantitatively large: compared to an annual rate of 
area expansion in Africa of some 1.8 million ha in 1961-2007, demand for land in Africa in 2009 alone 
amounted to some 39.7 million hectares--greater than the total agriculturally cultivated area of Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland combined.  
Two comments are in order to interpret this figure. First, it refers to demand for land deals rather than 
actual transactions or area brought under production. Second, as reports of land acquisitions are less likely 
in countries where press freedom is limited or where land acquisition is not ―new‖ or ―noteworthy‖, it 
may be biased downward and covering only the largest projects. Efforts to cross-check the information 
from press reports with administrative data in the countries where such information is available supports 
this in the sense that  while not all the projects mentioned in press reports could be identified in official 
data–presumably because some had never made it beyond expressions of interest–most lands actually 
transferred could be traced to press reports. Preliminary results from a recent effort to more systematically 
cross-check  press  reports  confirm  this  finding.
17  For each project, we code origin and  destination 
country,
18 size, commodities involved, investor type, and whether any activity had started.
19 The universe 
                                                 
16 The data can be accessed at www.farmlandgrab.org.  
17 Results will soon be posted on ILC‘s website http://www.commercialpressuresonland.org/monitoring-land-transactions.  
18 In Sub-Saharan Africa, key target countries are Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana and Mozambique, which account for 23% of projects. 21% of 
projects are in Latin America and the Caribbean (mainly Brazil and Argentina), 11% in Europe and Central Asia (Kazakh stan, Russia, and  
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comprises of 464 projects, 21% of which have started production.
20 Of these, 405 have information on 
crops and 203 on the area involved.
21 Among the latter projects, one quarter aims to cultivate more than 
200,000 ha each and a median size of 40,000 ha per project illustrates investors‘ ambitions.  
3.2 Econometric specification  
As we are interested in explaining the number of planned or actual projects in a host country, overall, or 
from a specific investor country, we use a count model and resort to a Poisson regression, to model the 
occurrence and count of investment projects in a host country or an origin-destination pair. Indexing host 
and destination countries by j and i, respectively, we let Nj denote the number of investment projects 
received  by  host country j  and Nij  the  count  of  investments  made  in  j by  investors  from  country  i. 
Assuming that Nj follows a Poisson distribution λj, we can write  
           
       
  
    
 
Specifying λj as a linear function of explanatory variables Xj, allows us to express the expectation of Nj 
conditionally on Xj. Denoting the conditional expectation by Lj, we obtain  
                        
where Xj is row vector of explanatory variables including a country‘s the amount of ―available‖ land, the 
yield gap,
22 the maximum potential value of agricultural production, our index of tenure security, and the 
strength of investment protection  and β j is a column vector of corresponding coefficients. Taking logs 
then allows us to formulate a model that can be estimated as  
           
where  lj  is  the  logarithm  of  Lj  and  parameters  βj,  are  estimated  by  maximum  likelihood  under  the 
assumption that different realization of the count variable Lj, i.e. the number of investment projects are 
independent from each other. As we estimate in logarithms, coefficients can easily be interpreted as 
elasticities and each element of the coefficient vector βj can then be interpreted as the change in the log of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ukraine), and 10% in South Asia East (Philippines, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR). Projects originate from a limited set of countries including 
China, the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain), North Africa (Libya and Egypt), Russia, the UK and the US. 
19 The coding was done by two separate data entry operators who referred to the original articles.  
20 Some 30% of projects were at an early exploratory stage, in 18% permission had been granted but no activity started, 30% were at initial level 
of development and only 21% had started production, often at a much lower level than envisaged. 
21 Most (37%) focus on food production, followed by annual/industrial crops and biofuels (21% each) , with the remainder going to livestock, 
parks, and forest plantations. In Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, food production is of greater importance.  
22 The yield gap measures the difference between the potential yields that could be observed given existing technology and currently observed 
yields (see Fischer and Shah 2011 for details).  
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the conditional expectation of the number of investment projects resulting from a one-unit increase in the 
value of the corresponding element of Xj.  
For the bilateral case, we replace lji with lji i.e., the number of planned or realized investments by investor 
origin country i in host j. Similarly, we replace Xj with Xij which can be partitioned into destination 
characteristics (VarDestj) origin attributes (VarOrigi), and bilateral variables (VarBilati,j) characterizing 
the specific origin-host pair. Formally, the bilateral count model (Poisson regression) is  
                                                
where variables are defined as above. In our empirical application, VarOrigi includes food dependence 
and the population of the country of origin, includes the same variables as in the unilateral case and 
VarBilat i,j  includes  the  physical  distance  between  the  two  countries  and  the  existence  of  a  historic 
colonizer / colonized relationship.  
Two common problems with log-linear gravity models relating to international trade and investment are 
the presence of zeros and heteroskedasticity of errors which can lead to bias and inconsistency of the OLS 
estimates. Our use of the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimator follows the suggestion to use 
this estimator as the best way to deal with these issues (Silva and Tenreyro 2006). It has, however, been 
argued that in trade models, large numbers of zeros may pose greater challenges than heteroskedasticity 
of errors and that, in this case, a simple Tobit will be preferable to a Poisson if the deviation from the 
assumed distribution of residuals is modest (Martin and Pham 2011). We thus complement the Poisson 
regressions with standard Tobit regression models, the results of which are reported in appendix tables.  
3.3 Key independent variables  
Means of key country characteristics, endowments, and institutional quality, are reported in Table 4 for 
the entire sample, and separately for all countries of origin, for countries of origin that are not also a 
destination country, for all destination countries, and  for destination countries that have at least one 
project under production (as opposed to only the target of interest in farmland). Origin countries have 
higher GDP than destinations (much higher in the case of ‗exclusive‘ origin countries that are not targeted 
at all for investment). They are net food importers, with net imports of US$ 12 per capita (US$ 211 for 
exclusive origin countries) while destination countries show net exports of US$ 30 per capita (US$ 99 per 
capita in destination countries with at least one operating project).  
Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of the information on potential output per ha, a direct reflection 
of land quality. Aggregating to the country level suggests that, surprisingly, destinations and origins do 
not differ widely from each other in terms of absolute land availability at this level of aggregation though  
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it is worth noting that destination countries with implemented projects are larger and have more abundant 
land for cultivation and land under forests (respectively 6.5 and 13.1 million hectares). On the contrary, 
origin countries have no such land left, as is most clearly visible for ―exclusive‖ ones, (with 0 and 0.1 
million hectares respectively for land for cultivation and land under forest). There is some difference in 
agro-ecological potential between the country categories: as one would expect if such investments were to 
follow comparative advantage, potential output values from cultivation of uncultivated land are higher in 
destination  than  origin  countries,  and  highest  in  those  with  implemented  projects.  Also,  with  origin 
countries  obtaining  more  than  half  of  the  attainable  yield  already  compared  to  about  one-third  in 
destinations, there appears to be potential for catch-up growth using existing technology. Interestingly, 
this potential is even greater in destination countries with implemented projects than in other destination 
countries. Data on governance suggest that, overall, regulatory quality, protection of investors‘ rights, and 
land governance are significantly weaker in destination countries. Interestingly, there is no significant 
difference in governance between destinations with and without implemented projects.  
4. Econometric results  
Analyzing the determinants of large agricultural investment in unilateral and bilateral models suggests 
that (i) agro-ecological suitability is indeed a critical factor for both demand and actual implementation; 
(ii) the difference between potential and actual production (i.e. the ―yield gap‖) affects land demand but 
not  project  implementation;  and  (iii)  while  conventional  governance  variables  are  at  most  weakly 
significant, a measure of land governance that incorporates the security of local land rights is highly 
significant, strongly suggesting that demand for land is significantly higher in settings where such rights 
are only weakly protected.  
4.1 Unilateral relationships  
Regressions for the count of projects involving large-scale land acquisition at the country of destination 
(unilateral case) are reported in Table 5 (where the top panel refers to all projects and the bottom panel to 
projects with some production only). While we only report results from the Poisson model, qualitatively 
similar results are obtained if we estimate the equation by OLS instead. Our results are also robust to a 
correction of the variance-covariance matrix of the ―sandwich‖ estimator to take into account possible 
problems  of  omitted  variable  and  intra-group  correlation  of  residuals.  In  all  cases,  the  potentially 
cultivable area outside of forests or the potential value of output on suitable non-forest area is highly 
significant, suggesting that land availability is a primary motivation for such investment. The coefficients 
of 0.496 and 0.688 for area (in col. 1) or 0.526 and 0.684 for potential output value (in col. 2) suggest 
that, other things being equal, a 10% increase of potentially suitable area or output value would increase  
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the number of projects by between 5.1% and 7.1%.
23 Surprisingly though, the coefficients for potentially 
cultivable area under forest or for the value of output in these areas are  not significantly different from 
zero. Although this does not imply that  the land rush does not pose environmental risks, it  is consistent 
with the notion that, except in some limited circumstances (e.g. oil palm in Indonesia), investor  interest 
tends to be focused on areas that have already been cleared.  
While the coefficient for the yield gap is positive and (marginally) significant in some regressions for all 
projects, it lacks significance in  the regressions for projects under production only. This would suggest 
that, even though investors may be attracted to countries with high yield gaps where returns to investment 
could be higher, they have thus far not generally anticipated being able to capitalize on this potential by 
introducing new technology. This is in line with the notion that introducing new technology to close yield 
gaps requires complementary (public) investment in infrastructure or support services.  
Finally, the results regarding the role of governance variables are of interest in two respects. On the one 
hand, and in contrast to the literature on FDI,  the coefficients on standard governance variables are not 
significant.
24  We report results  for investor  protection  only, noting that qualitatively similar  findings 
emerge if other standard governance variab les are included. While the point estimate is negative as 
expected, it is insignificant throughout, suggesting that a  more conducive investment climate  will not 
make it easier to attract land -related investment. On the other hand,  the effect of  land governance is 
striking. Instead of land acquisition projects being contingent on good land governance and the associated 
strong protection of rights, we find that weak land governance makes a country more attractive for land-
related  investment.  Furthermore,  the  effect  is  quantitatively  important:  a  one  standard  deviation 
deterioration in the land governance index (equivalent to the difference between  Angola and Brazil) 
would be predicted to increase the number of investment projects by 33%  even with other factors held 
constant (such as land abundance which would be associated with weaker land governance ). Although 
more detailed work at project level would be required to establish a causal link, a correlation along these 
lines suggests that, for much of the investment demand considered here, long-term security of tenure has 
been less of a concern for investors. Taken at face value, this coefficient means that expressed concerns of 
civil society  about the interests at play  being mostly extractive with little concern about long -term 
benefits to local populations may not be entirely misplaced. Interestingly, the significance of the 
coefficient disappears when considering only countries with projects under production (panel 2). This is 
consistent with the notion that, in countries with weak land governance or weak recognition of local land 
                                                 
23 The reported coefficient should be interpreted as the change in the logarithm of the conditional expectation of the number of projects associated 
with a unit increase in the explanatory variable. As the regressor is in logs, we have in the first case for instance dN/N=exp(0.0495)-1=0.051. 
24  Note  that  we  do  not  include  GDP  per  capita  in  our  regressions.  One  reason  is  that  we  want  to  focus  on  the  effect  of  some  specific 
characteristics of the agricultural sector rather than on the effect of overall economic performance. Another reason is that income per capita is 
often seen as an outcome of institutions and governance structure (Acemoglu et al. 2001) which are already included in our regressions.  
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rights, successful implementation of projects is difficult for a number of reasons, including resistance by 
local people during project implementation. Alternatively, it could imply that the phenomenon is too new 
to be observed in operations or that much of the interest reflected in press reports may be speculative.  
4.2 Bilateral relationships  
Poisson regressions for bilateral investor/host relationships in Table 6 (for interest in land acquisition) and 
in Table 7 (for actual implementation) allow a richer categorization of the phenomenon by considering 
investor and host country characteristics separately and by controlling with bilateral variables.
  The results 
from a standard Tobit which are reported in appendix tables A1 and A2 to complement the Poisson 
regression allay fears that our results could be driven by our specification only. As the substantive results 
from the Tobit are identical to the ones from the Poisson model, we limit our discussion to the Poisson 
specification. Overall, we note that the bilateral regressions confirm some of the conclusions from the 
unilateral approach, they also provide important and new insights on the drivers of the land rush.  
On the demand side, the amount of food imports per inhabitant and overall population size are key 
determinants of interest for land acquisition, suggesting that countries with large populations that depend 
on trade for food consumption are more likely to engage in investment projects requiring large-scale 
acquisition of land. It suggests that a desire to acquire land increasingly complements more traditional 
means of dealing with imbalances in food supply through markets and storage. Distance is a significant 
predictor of interest in acquiring land as in most gravity models, together with a past colonial relationship, 
although the significance of the latter vanishes when considering projects with actual production. 
Regarding host country characteristics, bilateral regressions point towards a significant improvement over 
unilateral regressions. They support the attractiveness of countries with large amounts of high potential 
agricultural land (but not forest land) or with the value of the output that can be obtained from such land, 
two variables which are highly significant throughout. For instance in regression (1) of Table 6, the 
coefficient of suitable non-forest land is 0.4664, which implies that an increase by 10% of potentially 
cultivable land in a host country would increase the number of projects in that country by almost 5%, all 
things else being equal (dN/N=exp(0.04664)-1=0.048). Similarly, the coefficient on the yield gap is large 
and significant in the regression for total demand but not for country relationships for projects under 
production, suggesting  that  low  yields and the  associated  opportunity  to catch  up  or leapfrog  to the 
frontier increases a country‘s attractiveness as a target for land acquisition. Translating potential into 
reality, however, is not as straightforward as it may appear in the abstract, partly because closing yield 
gaps requires a combination of factors, not all of which are easily modifiable by investors or modified 
without jeopardizing the economic viability of a venture.   
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Finally,  coefficients  on  governance  variables  that  are  traditionally  included  in  gravity  models  of 
investment (Control of corruption, and Political stability) are negative though not consistently significant 
suggesting that even once other factors are accounted for, investment tends to be higher in environments 
with weak governance. The coefficient on host countries‘ quality of land governance, which accounts in 
particular for the extent to which local rights are recognized, is highly significant and negative. For 
projects in production only, the significance of coefficients on standard governance variables disappears 
but the negative coefficient on land governance remains. This would imply that countries with weak 
governance are not only more attractive to prospective investors but that they are also more likely to 
actually have initiated production. Our data unfortunately do not provide evidence to suggest whether the 
level of production is in line with development plans or if locals actually receive benefits. The significant 
impact of weak governance suggested by our model could, of course, be due to the fact that this is the first 
wave of a new phenomenon, transparency on investment opportunities is lacking, and investors still have 
little experience of such investments. Nevertheless, concerns may be justified given the large amounts of 
transferred land in some countries and the necessity to identify and close down non-viable projects and 
prevent them from causing negative externalities. Unless more empirical evidence to allay such concerns 
is available, calls for a more proactive international response are likely to persist.
25  
5. Conclusion and policy implications  
While the ―land rush‖ has led to an animated debate, an overall view of the phenomenon and the drivers 
underlying it has thus far been missing. Combining press reports on demand for land acquisitions with a 
characterization of endowments at country level allows us to identify  factors underlying demand for 
agricultural land and actual projects. Dependence on food imports emerges as a strong driver of demand 
for land acquisition which is more likely to be located in countries with ample supply of land that are far 
from the technology frontier. While cultural affinity plays a role, weak land governance and protection of 
local land rights seem to be associated with higher rather than lower levels of investment even once other 
factors are controlled for. We conclude by highlighting implications from this rather surprising result.  
First, while this result reinforces the importance of industry standards and vigilance at project-level,
 26 it 
also highlights that, if they are to be effective and if a race to the bottom is to be prevented, they may need 
to be complemented with an effort to increase transparency and address land governance at the country 
level. Second, given the size of the phenomenon, a global effort –ideally spearheaded by an international 
                                                 
25 Although agricultural investment has many properties that set it apart from other sectors, there are obvious parallels to mining and other types 
of extractive industries that could provide lessons on the nature of a global response to improve transparency. 
26 FAO‘s voluntary guidelines (http://www.fao.org/nr/tenure/voluntary-guidelines/en/) devote considerable space to this issue and a separate 
effort at formulating principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment is underway (http://www.responsibleagroinvestment.org/rai/node/256). 
Institutional investors have adopted their own principles (www.unpri.org/farmlandprinciples), mirroring commodity-specific standards such as 
those promoted by the roundtable on responsible palm oil. More specific guidelines include multilateral banks‘ safeguards or  performance 
standards which have been adopted by the vast majority of financial institutions as ―Equator Principles‖.  
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institution- to document cross-national investments above a certain size  and in a consistent way that 
draws on national data seems urgent in order to protect rights and initiate more evidence-based dialogue 
and accumulation of norms and experience. Finally, reports stressing large numbers of failed investments 
have given rise to legislation or calls for limits on land purchases by foreigners in a number of countries 
such as Brazil, Argentina, and Ukraine. However, if a sizeable share of relevant deals involves nationals 
rather  than  foreigners  (Deininger  et  al  2011),  this  may  exacerbate  rather  than  resolve  governance 
challenges by, for example, limiting competition. Instead of protectionist measures, priority efforts to 
improve land governance
27 -e.g. by recognizing local rights, educating right holders,  and allowing their 
voluntary and transparent transfer- are likely to be a more appropriate policy response. 
                                                 
27 Key areas of emphasis could be (i) demarcation of state land (including forests and protected areas and clarification of the rights on these lands 
as well as ways in which they can be transferred to investors) and regular monitoring of new encroachment; (ii) provision of a minimum level of 
information (coordinates, size, projected investments, job creation, taxes and other benefits expected to local communities) to be made available 
publicly in a way that facilitates third party verification; (iii) clear procedures for contract enforcement and arbitration, including the dissolution 
of non-performing enterprises by any of the parties involved; (iv) education on rights and ways to enforce them before interests in acquisition 
materialize.  
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Table 1: Potential supply of land for rainfed cultivation (in million hectares) 
Region  Total area  Area close to market  
(<6 h travel time) 
Area far from market  
(>6 h travel time) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  201.5  94.9  106.6 
Latin America and the Caribbean  123.3  93.9  29.4 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  52.4  43.7  8.7 
East and South Asia  14.3  3.3  11.0 
Middle East and North Africa  3.0  2.6  0.4 
Rest of World  51.0  24.6  26.4 
Total  445.6  263.1  182.5 
Source: Deininger et al. 2010. 
Note: The figures are for currently uncultivated land that is suitable for cultivation of at least one of five key crops (wheat, 
sugarcane, oil palm, maize and soybean), excluding forests and protected areas, and with a population density of less than 25 
people per km
2 (.25 people per hectare)  
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Table 2: Extent of large land acquisitions in select countries, 2004–09 
Country  Projects  Area (1,000 ha)  Median size (ha)  Domestic share area 
Cambodia  61  958  8,985  70 
Ethiopia  406  1,190  700  49 
Liberia  17  1,602  59,374  7 
Mozambique  405  2,670  2,225  53 
Nigeria  115  793  1,500  97 
Sudan  132  3,965  7,980  78 
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Figure 1: Evolution of the Commodity food price index and number of media reports on foreign land acquisitions 
 
Source: IMF Commodity food price index and GRAIN (http://farmlandgrab.org) for press reports. 
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Table 3: Historical land expansion and recent land demand expressed in media reports 
Region  Cultivated land area (millions of ha)  Annual change (%)  Land demand 2009 
 
1961  1997  2007  1961-1997  1997-2007  Mn ha  year eq. 
Sub-Saharan Africa  134.6  192.2  218.5  1.60  2.63  39.7  21.8 
East Asia & Pacific  183.9  235.7  262.8  1.44  2.72  8.0  4.6 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia  291.5  263.6  241.7  -0.77  -2.19  4.6  n.a. 
Latin America  102.6  160.9  168.0  1.62  0.71  3.2  2.2 
Middle-East & North Africa  77.9  91.3  89.0  0.37  -0.23  1.4  n.a. 
South Asia  197.9  212.9  213.5  0.41  0.06  0.7  2.1 
North America  235.3  232.5  225.3  -0.08  -0.72  0.2  n.a. 
Western Europe  99.4  86.8  83.5  -0.35  -0.32  0.0  n.a. 
Oceania  34.0  42.8  46.7  0.25  0.38  0.0  0.2 
World total  1,357.1  1,518.6  1,549.0  4.49  3.04  57.8  13.9 
Notes: Cultivated area is land under arable or permanent crops. ‗Land demand 2009‘ refers to intended or actual land acquisitions 
based on media reports over a period of 11 months (October 2008 – August 2009). The last column (‗year eq.‘) identifies this 
demand in terms of the number of years using average annual expansion over the 1961-2007 period.   
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Table 4: Key descriptive statistics, overall and for origin, destination, and destination with projects  
Variable 
 
Total  Origin  Origin 
only 
Destination 
(a)  Destination with impl. 
projects only 
(b) 
Country level variables   
            Total Population (mn.)  32  86  26  67 
 
105  * 
GDP per capita (USD, 2005 PPP)  11,640  18,028  60,407  6,354  ***  7,295 
  Value of food imports (mn. USD)  3239  8533  12,514  3,158  ***  4,440  * 
Value of food exports (mn. USD)  3,180  8,844  9,217  4,052  **  6,215  ** 
Food Dependence  117  12  211  -30  ***  -99  ** 
Land use and endowment   
            Cultivated Land (mn. Ha)   8.7  20.2  3.9  16.5  *  26.1  *** 
Non-Forest Land Suitable for Cultivation (mn. ha)  3.8  6.5  0.6  7.4  **  12.0  *** 
Forest Land Suitable for Cultivation (mn. Ha)  5.8  11.6  0.4  11.5  *  18.1  ** 
Suitable non-forest land w. low pop. dens. (mn. 
ha)  2.0  3.4  0.0  3.9  **  6.5  *** 
Suitable forest land w. low pop. dens. (mn. ha)  4.2  8.7  0.1  8.4 
 
13.1  * 
Max potential output value on uncultivated, non-
forested and non protected land (log mn USD)  7.9  8.3  6.8  8.9  ***  9.6  *** 
Max potential output value on uncultivated, 
forested and non protected land (log mn USD)  7.2  7.7  5.9  8.1  ***  8.8  ** 
Yield gap (Percent)  0.60  0.47  0.27  0.66  ***  0.62  * 
Institutional quality    
     
*** 
    Regulatory Quality Rank (Percent)  49.7  62.5  80.1  38.9  ***  40.4 
  Rule of Law Rank  (Percent)  49.4  59.8  80.0  35.9  ***  37.8 
  Control of Corruption  Rank  (Percent)  49.5  58.9  80.5  37.5  ***  37.2 
  Political Stability & No Violence Rank (Percent)  49.2  49.5  67.5  34.2  ***  35.4 
  Voice & Accountability Rank (Percent)  49.4  52.2  64.2  36.7  ***  39.0 
  Weak Investor Protection  85.7  70.6  60  90.4  **  87.8 
  Land Tenure Security Index  -0.02  0.61  2.15  -0.98  ***  -0.95 
  No. of observations (countries)  215  56  23  84 
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  Notes: The table shows unweighted averages of country characteristics. It includes 215 countries of which 107 are either 
investors or host countries in the period October 1, 2008 to August 31, 2009 and 33 countries are both host countries and 
investors. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
(a) Significance of t-test for difference between averages in destination countries and countries of origin only. 
(b) Significance of t-test for difference between averages in destination countries with implemented projects and destination 
countries where no project is under production. 
Other notes: Food dependence is defined as the value of net food imports per inhabitant. It is positive for net importers and 
negative for net exporters;  Suitable non-forest land with low population density is the amount of potentially suitable land that is 
neither currently used for agricultural production nor settled with more than 25 inhabitants per km
2 is calculated as discussed in 
the text and excludes protected areas (Source: FAO and IIASA);  The value of potential output is obtained for choosing the best 
culture as the market prices and yields. It is expressed in logarithm of the value in millions of dollars (Source: FAO and IIASA); 
The yield gap is the difference between performance that is technically achievable and the effective yield observed (Source: FAO 
and IIASA); The variables Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, 
and Voice and Accountability are from the Worldwide Governance Indicators database and are expressed in percentile of the 
distribution of descending rank (Source: World Bank). A low value thus characterizes a country where governance is poor;  The 
index of weak protection of investors is the rank of the variable Strong investor protection in the Doing Business database and is 
comprised between 1 and 215 (Source: International Finance Corporation, World Bank). A high value of this index reflects 
situations where investors are poorly protected; The tenure security index is constructed by the French Development Agency 
(AFD). This is the first projection on the axis of a Principal Component Analysis of the variables contained in the land based 
Institutional Profiles (Source: Ministry of Finance and AFD). The index is interpreted as a measure of security of tenure enjoyed 
by local people. A low value implies high levels of tenure insecurity. 
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Figure 2: Maximum potential value of agricultural output (in US Dollars per hectare) 
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Table 5: Poisson regressions for the number of projects in a destination country 
 
All projects  
 
Potentially cultivable area non-forest   0.4946*** 
       
 
[0.121] 
        Potentially cultivable area forest   -0.0205 
       
 
[0.070] 
        Max. possible output value non-forest area  
 
0.5257***  0.5296***  0.5122***  0.5086*** 
   
[0.108]  [0.110]  [0.139]  [0.140] 
Max. possible output value forest area  
 
-0.0159  -0.0405  -0.0523  -0.0658 
   
[0.060]  [0.060]  [0.064]  [0.064] 
Yield gap   0.6033  0.9061*  1.1224**  -0.2444  -0.0245 
 
[0.416]  [0.474]  [0.524]  [0.710]  [0.696] 
Land governance indicator  
     
-0.1735**  -0.1779** 
       
[0.078]  [0.081] 
Weak investor protection  








No. of observations  137  143  135  107  105 
Pseudo R
2  0.325  0.297  0.293  0.290  0.292 
 
Projects with some production only 
 
Potentially cultivable area non-forest   0.6876*** 
       
 
[0.156] 
        Potentially cultivable area forest   -0.0083 
       
 
[0.094] 
        Max. possible output value non-forest area  
 
0.6840***  0.6894***  0.6199***  0.6148*** 
   
[0.139]  [0.145]  [0.165]  [0.166] 
Max. possible output value forest area  
 
-0.0435  -0.0684  -0.0606  -0.0734 
   
[0.077]  [0.079]  [0.079]  [0.080] 
Yield gap   0.1057  0.5362  0.7641  -0.3172  -0.0872 
 
[0.517]  [0.617]  [0.753]  [1.003]  [1.017] 
Land governance indicator  
     
-0.1422  -0.1456 
       
[0.108]  [0.109] 
Weak investor protection  








No. of observations  137  143  135  107  105 
Pseudo R
2  0.346  0.271  0.266  0.230  0.229 
Notes:  Variable in logs. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 
the 10% level. Constant included but not reported.  
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Table 6: Poisson regressions for the number of projects in bilateral relations 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Bilateral variables                
Distance   -0.5900***  -0.6002***  -0.6165***  -0.5921***  -0.5878***  -0.5960***  -0.6171*** 
  [0.061]  [0.060]  [0.060]  [0.062]  [0.060]  [0.060]  [0.059] 
Colonial relationship  1.1699***  1.1558***  1.0550***  1.1714***  1.1726***  1.1840***  1.0545*** 
 
[0.263]  [0.265]  [0.221]  [0.265]  [0.265]  [0.261]  [0.220] 
Investor country variables                
Net food imports per inhabitant  3.3056***  3.3913***  3.3203***  3.3733***  3.3758***  3.3843***  3.3208*** 
 
[0.368]  [0.354]  [0.373]  [0.357]  [0.351]  [0.351]  [0.372] 
Population    0.7817***  0.7771***  0.7634***  0.7683***  0.7726***  0.7753***  0.7635*** 
 
[0.048]  [0.047]  [0.049]  [0.048]  [0.047]  [0.047]  [0.049] 
Host country variables               
Food exports   0.0320  0.0345  0.0974***  0.0203  0.0604*  0.0477  0.0984*** 
 
[0.032]  [0.031]  [0.037]  [0.033]  [0.034]  [0.033]  [0.035] 
Suitable non-forest land   0.4664***             
 
[0.074]             
Suitable forest land   0.0320             
 
[0.043]             
Max. possible output value non-
forest area  
 
0.5162***  0.4830***  0.5307***  0.4904***  0.4909***  0.4846*** 
 
  [0.072]  [0.089]  [0.074]  [0.076]  [0.077]  [0.091] 
Max. possible output value forest 
area  
 
0.0280  -0.0114  0.0050  0.0328  0.0302  -0.0118 
 
  [0.041]  [0.043]  [0.041]  [0.040]  [0.041]  [0.043] 
Yield gap  0.9486**  1.3042***  0.4959  1.3590***  0.9265**  1.0388**  0.5075 
 
[0.376]  [0.404]  [0.519]  [0.442]  [0.472]  [0.439]  [0.511] 
Land governance index       -0.2082***        -0.2136*** 
 
    [0.049]        [0.059] 
Weak investor protection         -0.0013       
 
      [0.001]       
Control of corruption (%)          -0.0072*     
 
        [0.004]     
Political stability (%)            -0.0070*  0.0007 
 
          [0.004]  [0.004] 
No. of observations  25,704  26,838  20,223  25,515  26,838  26,838  20,223 
Pseudo R
2  0.269  0.265  0.261  0.260  0.266  0.267  0.261 
Notes:  Variable in logs. Robust standard errors in brackets*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 
the 10% level. Constant included but not reported.   
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Table 7: Poisson regressions for the number of operating projects in bilateral relations 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
       
   
    Bilateral variables                
Distance   -0.7253***  -0.7243***  -0.7066***  -0.7121***  -0.7140***  -0.7209***  -0.7107*** 
  [0.097]  [0.094]  [0.094]  [0.095]  [0.091]  [0.093]  [0.091] 
Colonial relationship  0.8934*  0.8914*  0.8718  0.9003*  0.8981*  0.9057*  0.8766 
 
[0.530]  [0.513]  [0.578]  [0.516]  [0.513]  [0.513]  [0.579] 
Investor country variables                
Net food imports per inhabitant ($)  1.9477*  2.2305**  2.1871**  2.2658**  2.2132**  2.2243**  2.1912** 
 
[1.080]  [0.926]  [0.953]  [0.923]  [0.923]  [0.924]  [0.953] 
Population    0.7522***  0.7379***  0.7285***  0.7388***  0.7344***  0.7364***  0.7289*** 
 
[0.083]  [0.083]  [0.085]  [0.084]  [0.082]  [0.083]  [0.085] 
Host country variables 
     
   
    Food exports   0.0705  0.0783  0.1318**  0.0640  0.0981  0.0864  0.1386** 
 
[0.061]  [0.059]  [0.065]  [0.064]  [0.067]  [0.062]  [0.063] 
Suitable non-forest land (mn ha)  0.7015*** 
   
   
   
 
[0.149] 
   
   
    Suitable forest land (mn. ha)  0.0154 
   
   
   
 
[0.092] 
   
   
    Max. possible output value non-
forest area  
 
0.7000***  0.6124***  0.7121***  0.6769***  0.6872***  0.6218*** 
   
[0.126]  [0.149]    [0.129]  [0.138]  [0.132]  [0.151] 
Max. possible output value forest 
area  
 
-0.0251  -0.0415  -0.0441  -0.0186  -0.0251  -0.0432 
   
[0.072]  [0.077]  [0.074]  [0.072]  [0.073]  [0.078] 
Yield gap  0.5036  1.1073  0.4565  1.1729  .7851  0.9373  0.5484 
 
[0.681]  [0.754]  [1.002]  [0.817]  [0.886]  [0.811]  [0.983] 
Land governance index  
   
-0.1930**     
 
-0.2296** 
     
[0.095]     
 
[0.117] 
Weak investor protection  
     
-0.0015   
   
       
[0.003]   
    Control of corruption (%) 
     
  -0.0057 
   
       
  [0.008] 
    Political stability (%) 
     
    -0.0041  -0.0048 
       
    [0.006]  [0.007] 
No. of observations  25,704  26,838  20,223  25,515  26,848  26,838  20,223 
Pseudo R
2  0.254  0.231  0.217  0.228  0.231  0.231  0.218 
Notes:  Variable in logs. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 
the 10% level. Constant included but not reported.   




Table A1: Number of projects in bilateral relations (Tobit model) 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Bilateral variables                
Distance   -0.7945***  -0.8322***  -0.8683***  -0.8179***  -0.8238***  -0.8298***  -0.8713*** 
  [0.090]  [0.090]  [0.098]  [0.093]  [0.090]  [0.090]  [0.097] 
Colonial relationship  1.7922***  1.7831***  1.7156***  1.8470***  1.8054***  1.7942***  1.7244*** 
 
[0.367]  [0.372]  [0.370]  [0.376]  [0.373]  [0.372]  [0.370] 
Investor country variables                
Net food imports per inhabitant  3.1667***  3.3265***  3.1637***  3.3112***  3.2892***  3.3007***  3.1752*** 
 
[0.634]  [0.638]  [0.684]  [0.644]  [0.636]  [0.636]  [0.681] 
Population    0.9259***  0.9302***  0.9272***  0.9232***  0.9252***  0.9278***  0.9281*** 
 
[0.074]  [0.075]  [0.078]  [0.076]  [0.075]  [0.075]  [0.078] 
Host country variables               
Food exports   0.0102  0.0109  0.1023**  -0.0132  0.0413  0.0203  0.1117** 
 
[0.042]  [0.041]  [0.049]  [0.044]  [0.046]  [0.043]  [0.048] 
Suitable non-forest land   0.5331***             
 
[0.080]             
Suitable forest land   0.0764             
 
[0.052]             
Max. possible output value non-
forest area  
 
0.6694***  0.6271***  0.6940***  0.6499***  0.6529***  0.6320*** 
 
  [0.082]  [0.099]  [0.086]  [0.085]  [0.086]  [0.101] 
Max. possible output value forest 
area  
 
0.0513  0.0006  0.0166  0.0511  0.0520  -0.0014 
 
  [0.054]  [0.055]  [0.054]  [0.053]  [0.053]  [0.056] 
Yield gap  1.0761**  1.3286***  0.4109  1.3805***  0.9686*  1.0886**  0.5074 
 
[0.495]  [0.501]  [0.632]  [0.533]  [0.553]  [0.532]  [0.617] 
Land governance index       -0.2618***        -0.3005*** 
 
    [0.061]        [0.073] 
Weak investor protection         -0.0016       
 
      [0.002]       
Control of corruption (%)          -0.0077*     
 
        [0.005]     
Political stability (%)            -0.0061  0.0049 
 
          [0.004]  [0.005] 
No. of observations  25,704  26,838  20,223  25,515  26,838  26,838  20,223 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -1701  -1735  -1558  -1704  -1733  -1734  -1558 
Notes:  Variable in logs. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 
the 10% level. Constant included but not reported.  
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Table A2: Number of operating projects in bilateral relations (Tobit model) 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
       
   
    Bilateral variables                
Distance   -0.9045***  -0.8857***  -0.8864***  -0.8712***  -0.8746***  -0.8832***  -0.8910*** 
  [0.120]  [0.115]  [0.122]  [0.117]  [0.115]  [0.115]  [0.122] 
Colonial relationship  1.0712*  1.0008*  0.8782  1.0157*  1.0175*  1.0047*  0.9063 
 
[0.604]  [0.598]  [0.645]  [0.603]  [0.597]  [0.596]  [0.647] 
Investor country variables                
Net food imports per inhabitant ($)  1.5390  1.8808**  1.7706*  1.9251**  1.8179*  1.8404*  1.8030* 
 
[1.018]  [0.959]  [0.964]  [0.959]  [0.956]  [0.958]  [0.951] 
Population    0.7674***  0.7406***  0.7361***  0.7422***  0.7343***  0.7381***  0.7381*** 
 
[0.094]  [0.095]  [0.098]  [0.096]  [0.094]  [0.095]  [0.097] 
Host country variables 
     
   
    Food exports   0.0497  0.0835  0.1684**  0.0571  0.1259*  0.0970  0.1829** 
 
[0.064]  [0.066]  [0.075]  [0.068]  [0.073]  [0.069]  [0.075] 
Suitable non-forest land (mn ha)  0.6763*** 
   
   
   
 
[0.150] 
   
   
    Suitable forest land (mn. ha)  0.0670 
   
   
   
 
[0.094] 
   
   
    Max. possible output value non-
forest area  
 
0.6785***  0.5651***  0.7009***  0.6469***  0.6577***  0.5768*** 
   
[0.128]  [0.152]  [0.130]  [0.137]  [0.136]  [0.155] 
Max. possible output value forest 
area  
 
-0.0513  -0.0612  -0.0795  -0.0436  -0.0480  -0.0677 
   
[0.077]  [0.076]  [0.076]  [0.074]  [0.075]  [0.079] 
Yield gap  0.1034  0.5950  -0.4786  0.6611  0.0905  0.2921  -0.3292 
 
[0.735]  [0.719]  [0.928]  [0.781]  [0.832]  [0.797]  [0.915] 
Land governance index  
   
-0.3112***     
 
-0.3730*** 
     
[0.094]     
 
[0.109] 
Weak investor protection  
     
-0.0026   
   
       
[0.003]   
    Control of corruption (%) 
     
  -0.0104 
   
       
  [0.007] 
    Political stability (%) 
     
    -0.0074  0.0078 
       
    [0.007]  [0.007] 
No. of observations  25,704  26,838  20,223  25,515  26,848  26,838  20,223 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -503.8  -539.9  -513.4  -532.9  -538.5  -539.1  -512.8 
Notes:  Variable in logs. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 
the 10% level. Constant included but not reported.  
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